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COST-EFFECTIVE WILDERNESS FIRE MANAGEMENT: 
A CASE STUDY IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 
Christian A. Childers and Douglas D. 
Abstract-Federal wilderness fire management policies have been scrutinizedsince catastrophic fires in
 
the Greater Area in 1988. While wilderness tire management objectives are still aimed at
 
recreating natural fire regimes, all USDA Forest Service fire management programs must be
Since current Forest Service economic analyses do not fully the value of fire wilderness, a
 
cost-effectiveness analysis was developed to compare wilderness fire management options. The analytical
 
procedure is briefly reviewed, illustrated a California case study and case study results arc
 
discussed. These results suggest that containment of some tires may be more than current
 
control-oriented practices.
 
Federal wilderness fire management policies have been 
scrutinized since the catastrophic in the Greater 
Yellowstone Area in 1988. this context, is a 
tire of any size that in excessive resource damage, 
excessive suppression costs, excessive to private 
inholdings, or loss of life (Savcland 1986). No lives were 
lost in Yellowstonc and many have argued the bcnctits, rather 
than damages, of these to the Yellowstone ecosystems, 
but private lands were and suppression costs were 
excessive (US Senate 1988). While wilderness fire 
management objectives are still aimed at recreating natural 
tire regimes, all Forest Service fire management programs 
must be cost-effective. If these objectives were difficult to 
implement in Yellowstone, they will be even more so in 
southern California, where chaparral covered wilderness areas 
are often surrounded by high valued private property and 
improvements. The Forest Service’s range of options to meet 
these objectives include the use of appropriate suppression 
responses and prescribed tire. 
Prescribed tires can take two forms: prescribed natural fires 
and management ignited prescribed fires (USDA Forest 
Service 1989). prescribed fires are monitored and 
managed through the use of detailed bum plans (USDA Forest 
Service 1989). Theoretically, the only difference between the 
two forms of prescribed tire is the source of the ignition, but 
the timing of the is also often different. Prescribed 
natural fires are naturally occurring unplanned ignitions 
usually caused by infrequent summer or fall lightning storms. 
Management ignited prescribed fires are ignited by Forest 
Service personnel on their own time schedule when burning 
conditions and resource availabilities are optimal (usually late 
fall, winter, or spring in southern California). 
‘Graduate Research Assistant and Professor, respectively, Natural 
Resources Management Department, Cal San Luis Obispo, CA. 
Any fire not classified as a prescribed tire is a wildfire and 
must an appropriate suppression response. These 
range from suppression efforts aimed at 
the tire as small as possible (a control response) to 
or confinement responses. Containment means 
surrounding a with minimal control lines and utilizing 
natural barriers to stop its spread. means 
limiting a fire’s spread to a predetermined area principally 
using natural barriers, preconstructed barriers, or 
environmental conditions (USDA Forest Service 1989). 
A cost-effectiveness analysis has been developed to compare 
options for wilderness fire management programs 
(Childers and Piirto 1989). In this analysis, approximating 
the average annual burned area of the natural fire regime is 
defined as the objective, fire gaming is used to develop 
representative fire costs and sizes, and decision trees are used 
to develop expected annual cost and burned area values for a 
of fire management alternatives. This paper briefly 
reviews the analytical procedure, illustrates the procedure 
through a southern California case study (two contiguous 
wilderness areas on Los Padres National Forest, Santa 
Barbara, CA.), and discusses the case study results. 
THE STUDY AREA 
Our case study area comprises 23 1,500 acres of the Dick 
Smith and San Rafael Wilderness Areas on Los Padres 
National Forest (fig. 1). The vegetation of this area is 
predominantly chaparral brush species, including 
(Adenostoma sciculatum), assorted ceanothus and 
species (Ceanothus spp. and spp.), two types 
of scrub oak (Ouercus dumosa and 0. turbinella) and several 
other pyrophytic shrubs. The chaparral intergrades 
with coast live oak [Ouercus aerifolia) in some riparian areas, 
big cone Douglas fir Psuedotsuea macrocama)  and digger 
pine Pinus  on some north slopes, and a variety of 
other pines at higher elevations. Fire is a natural component 
of of these ecosystems. 
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 Figure l--Los Padres National Forest, with the Dick Smith and San Rafael Wilderness Areas highlighted 
COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
Most Forest Service economic analyses use cost-benefit 
models. For example, economic analysis of forest level fire 
management programs is based on the Cost Plus Net Value 
Change (C + NVC) model (USDA Forest Service 1987). C 
+ NVC computes the sum of program costs and the 
quantifiable (in monetary terms) effects of fire on resource 
values. To be efficient, these analyses must 
include the effects of on all relevant resources. C + 
NVC models currently include effect values for many 
primary forest resources such as timber, minerals, and forage, 
and many wilderness outputs such as water, and wildlife 
(measured in numbers of visits by hunters and fishermen), 
and recreational use (USDA Forest Service 1987). Fire’s 
effects on these resources can be and usually is much different 
than its effects on a wilderness ecosystem. Since the primary 
economic value of wilderness remains undefined, fire’s effects 
on wilderness also remain undefined. A cost-benefit analysis 
which does not include all of the relevant costs and benefits 
will be incomplete, and often misleading (Williams 1973). 
Therefore, analyses based solely on C + NVC models are 
inadequate for wilderness management planning. 
(1986) avoided this C + NVC problem in a 
cost-effectiveness comparison of tire management options for 
the Frank Church-River of No Return Wilderness Area. In 
his Analysis, the costs of each alternative were the expected 
annual suppression costs. “Effectiveness” was the 
approximation of the average “natural” annual burned ares 
based on what fire history studies revealed. (1986) 
justified this well: Plant communities require a certain amount 
of fire, just as they require a certain amount of 
precipitation. the average annual burned area would 
be like altering the average annual rainfall. Though 
Saveland’s analysis involved a different fire regime and 
setting, his definitions and much of his methodology are 
appropriate for southern California’s chaparral. 
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), in its truest form, 
compares the costs of different alternatives, where each 
alternative will meet the desired objectives, or have the same 
effects. A CEA has five key elements: the objective; the 
alternatives; the costs; the model; and a criterion for ranking 
the alternatives (Quade 1967). 
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 The Objective 
The most important, and the most difficult, step in CEA 
is a clear definition of the goals or the objectives. Public 
policy usually includes several goals or objectives and these 
are often conflicting (Quade 1982). Forest Service Policy is 
no exception. The Forest Service Manual (USDA Forest 
Service 1986) defines two objectives for wilderness fire 
management: 
1. (to) permit lightning caused fires to play, as nearly as
 
possible, their natural ecological role in wilderness;
 
2. (to) reduce to an acceptable level, the risks and
 
consequences of wildfire within wilderness or escaping from
 
wilderness.
 
The value of fire playing its natural ecological role is 
currently unquantifiable in monetary terms; thus, it is not 
included in Forest Service economic evaluations. The 
consequences of fire are more straight forward. They include 
resource and property damage and suppression costs. Risk, 
while also difficult to quantify monetarily, is the probability 
of a fire resulting in excessive resource damages or 
suppression costs. Current Los Padres National Forest tire 
management plans stress the second objective (reducing the 
risks and consequences); proposed wildfire responses are 
suppression intensive (control and contain strategies) and no 
wilderness prescribed fires have been planned. The Forest’s 
current wilderness fire management objective might be to 
respond to and suppress each ignition at minimal cost, 
regardless of annual burned area. If we are interested in 
allowing lightning fire to play its natural role, this must be 
included in the analysis. Our redefined objective might then 
be to recreate the natural fire regime at minimal cost. 
To further define this objective, we need to look at the natural 
fire return interval. By defining the maximum time interval 
between fires, we can determine the minimal average annual 
burned area required to recreate the natural fire regime. 
Research suggests that the area’s chaparral historically burned 
every 30 years (Byrne 1979, Minnich 1983). Los Padres 
National Forest fire records (1911-1987) suggest that the 
chaparral bums every 45 years (USDA Forest Service 1988). 
Forty-five years probably represents the maximum fire return 
interval since these records were taken while all fires were 
being actively suppressed. Using the return interval, 
an average of over 5,000 acres of the 23 study area 
would have to bum annually. It is important to note that this 
average is a long-term objective, not an annual 
goal. In some years, acres might bum while 
in other years no prescribed fires will be implemented (just as 
lightning strikes frequently in some years, while no lightning 
activity occurs in other years). 
The Alternatives 
Four alternatives were chosen for the Los Padres CEA. 
1. Alternative 1 is the Forest Service’s past policy: Control 
all wildfires regardless of cause, and attempt to meet annual 
burned area objectives through prescribed burning. 
2. Alternative 2 is the fire management strategy proposed in 
the Los Padres’ Land Management Plan: Contain all fires 
which occur under low intensity and control all moderate to 
high intensity tires, while pursuing an active prescribed 
burning program. 
3. Alternative 3 (the Confinement Alternative): all 
low intensity starts, contain moderate to high intensity starts, 
and control only the starts which occur under extreme tire 
weather conditions (augmented by prescribed burning as 
needed). 
4. Alternative 4 (the Prescribed Natural Fire Alternative):
 
The same as Alternative 3, with the addition of an approved
 
plan for prescribed natural fire management.
 
The Costs 
Only the relevant variable costs should be included in a CEA 
(Quade 1982). 
Fixed costs--those that remain the same for each 
not be included. For this analysis, 
costs include suppression equipment, suppression manning 
levels, and fire management Personnel,, because these 
forestwide resource level on over 
fires a year and an average of less than two ignitions occur 
annually in the ease study area. The variable costs that must 
be considered are annual suppression costs, prescribed 
costs, and for fires originating in the study area. 
The ‘Model 
A model is a simplified representation of the real world which 
includes all of the relevant features (Quade 1967). Decision 
trees can be used to evaluate alternative fire management 
programs in the face of uncertainties about future 
occurrences, weather, behavior, and sizes (Hirsch and others 
1981).  Decision trees are used to develop expected values. 
Expected values are probability weighted averages of all 
possible outcomes. Expected values are not predictions of 
actual future costs due to the many variables involved in 
tires; they provide relative values for comparison. 
For our analysis, decision tree probabilities were derived 
from fire history records. The range of cost and burned area 
values were developed through fire gaming since no 
or comparable fire history records were available for 
containment, confinement, or prescribed natural fire responses 
(Childers and Piirto 1989). 
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Figure Z-The decision tree for Alternative 
A decision tree must be for each alternative, using 
the same probabilities but with different suppression responses 
and thus different cost and burned area values. The 
probabilities for each branch of the trees were calculated from 
the (I 963-87) fire history of the San Rafael and Dick 
Smith Wilderness Areas (Childers and 1989). The 
decision tree for Alternative 4 of the Los Padres study 2) 
illustrates the values and probabilities which were developed 
for our CEA. Alternative 4’s decision tree is presented since 
it is the most complex decision tree (this is the only 
in which strategy is not based on weather 
pattern). 
Fire gaming is the prediction of fire sizes by 
fire management professionals. Predictions are based on the 
interactions of estimated tire behavior conditions and given 
suppression force responses (Harrod and Smith 1983). Our 
garners included the fire management personnel from the 
Forest Supervisor’s Office and from each of the three ranger 
districts responsible for the case study area. The “games” 
consisted of first mapping an overlay of the free-burning fire 
(without any suppression efforts) for a series of time 
periods. Four weather patterns were mapped at each location 
and these “fires” were then controlled, contained, confined 
and managed as prescribed natural tires to develop the cost 
and burned area values needed to fill in each decision tree. 
Net Resource Value Changes were calculated using 
the Forest’s 1988 NVC values based on acreage burned by 
intensity level in each watershed (Childcrs 1991). 
Management ignited prescribed fire costs were subjectively 
estimated at per acre by the garners and by the Santa 
Barbara Ranger District’s Fuels Management Staff. This is 
more expensive than most recent prescribed fires adjacent to 
the case study wilderness areas, but initial wilderness 
prescribed tires will probably be expensive due to the age and 
continuity of the fuelbeds, remoteness of the fires, and 
limitations on control lines and the use of mechanized 
equipment in wildcmess. 
A Criterion 
The criterion for ranking alternatives depends on the agency’s 
goals and objectives. Many different rankings are possible. 
For this analysis, we defined our objective as the recreation 
of the natural fire regime at minimal cost. Given current 
budgetary constraints, minimizing costs regardless of burned 
area might be the agency’s actual objective. The sources of 
proposed expenditures (i.e., forest fire fighting funds vs. 
program or budgeted dollars) might be important 
considerations. Risk is also a concern. Finally, the ignition 
source and timing of the tires might be important to 
prescribed tire planners. Therefore, all of this information 
must be provided. 
RESULTS 
Four weather patterns were gamed at each of four fire 
locations: the set at representative fire location (RL) 
the second at RL 2, the third at RL 3, and the fourth set 
under double ignition conditions (two tires occurring 
simultaneously) using 2 and 4 (Childers 1991). The 
results of these games are presented in table 1. These values 
Table size and cost figures for gamed fires. 
CONTROL CONTAIN CONFINE Rx Natural Fire 
Size cost Size cost Size cost Size cost 
(acres) (8) (acres)
Representative Fire Game 1  
(acres) (acres) 
Ueather Pattern A 0.5 7,693 0.5 5,113 4.0 3,095 4.0 3,689 
Weather Pattern 2.0 7,900 2.0 4,722 450.0 6,530 450.0 6,941 
Weather Pattern C 
Ueather Pattern D 
120.0 84,592 265.0 51,730 
40.0 36,989 390.0 41,403 
(not gamed) 
(not gamed) 
(not gamed)
(not gamed) 
Representative Fire Game 2 
Weather Pattern A 0.3 3,129 0.3 2,756 3.0 2,887 740.0 47,814 
Weather Pattern 70.0 40,498 780.0 47,792 163,384 1,965.0 182,254 
Ueather Pattern C 
Weather Pattern D 
145.0 86,604 780.0 93,335 
366,894 527,336 
(not gamed) 
(not gamed) 
(not gamed)
(not gamed) 
Representative Fire Game 3 
Ueather Pattern A 0.1 8,415 0.1 4,427 2,525 0 . 1  4,821 
Weather Pattern 0.1 7,541 0.1 4,896 401 833.0 110,546 
Weather Pattern 
Weather Pattern 
C 
D 
18,249 10.0 
370,193 
9,029 
910,362 
40.0 17,807 
(not gamed) 
835.0 88,639 
(not gamed) 
Representative fire Game 4 
Weather Pattern A 3,275 0.5 2,903 5.0 3,475 740.0 48,227 
Weather Pattern 44,518 785.0 61,549 1,955.0 167,088 183,371 
Ueather Pattern 
Weather Pattern 
C 136,861 800.0 98,496 
D 2.260.0 851,674 2.800.0 973.519 
(not gamed) 
(not gamed) 
(not gamed)
(not 
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were then run through the appropriate alternatives’ decision 
trees (as per Childers and 1989) and expected values 
for average annual suppression costs, burned area, and 
were calculated for each decision tree. These results are 
presented in table 2. 
Table 3 includes a breakdown of annual suppression costs and 
acreage into prescribed and forest fire fighting (FFF) 
costs. Table 3 also illustrates the prescribed bum acreage and 
costs that would be required to meet our average 
annual burned area objective under each alternative. All cost 
values are presented in 1988 dollars. 
DISCUSSION 
One of the most obvious observations from the decision tree 
results (table 2) and the total cost of implementing each 
alternative (table 3) is that alternatives 1 and 2 are very 
similar, as are alternatives 3 and 4. This can be attributed to 
the similarity of the containment and control responses and 
the confinement and prescribed natural fire responses as they 
were used on many of the gamed One gamer concluded 
that they were still “fighting” the fires, even under the 
prescribed natural responses. For example, the actual 
dispatch cards of initial attack resources were used to 
determine who would respond to each fire under both 
containment and control; thus, many of the same resources 
were used on both of these strategies. The run cards were 
heavily modified for confinement and prescribed natural fire 
responses, but the objectives of these two were similar. 
Once these strategies have been implemented, familiarity with 
appropriate suppression responses and pre-approved 
prescribed fire bum plans should lead to greater differences in 
their results. Despite the similarities, these results do provide 
some valuable information for the decisionmaker. 
Table 2--Average annual and prescribed natural fire cost, cost and 
San Rafael Wilderness Areas highlighted per acre managed, average annual 
burned area, and average annual cost per area burned for four alternative 
fire management programs for the Dick Figure decision tree for 
Alternative 4 Smith and San Rafael Uilderness Areas 
Average 
annual 
cost 
Cost per 
acre 
managed 
Average 
annual 
burned 
area 
(acres) 
Average 
annual 
cost per 
burned 
acre 
Historical 
Alternative 1 9197,611 $0.85 394.8 $500.53 
2 9195,474 SO.84 447.2 $437.11 
Alternative 3 8334,773 $1.45 $211.88 
4 8341,586 $1.48 $205.92 
Table of total average annual suppression/management costs 
and burned areas by source 
A L T E R N A T I V E 
1 2 3 4 
Acreage: 394.8 447.2 
Rx Natural Fire Acreage: 0.0 0.0 0.0 115.6 
Mgt Ign Rx Fire Acreage: 
costs: $197,611 $195,474 $334,773 $331,140 
Rx Natural Fire Costs: 0 0 0 $10,446 
Mgt Ign Rx Fire Costs: $230,260 $227,640 $171,000 $167,060 
Total Annual Costs: $427,871 $423,114 $505,773 $508,646 
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If the agency’s goal was simply to respond to and suppress or 
manage each ignition at minimal cost, regardless of annual 
burned area, alternative 2 would be the most cost-effective. 
This result is due to the cost-saving advantages of containment 
over control on most lower intensity tires and the expensive 
outcomes that can result from trying to confine or manage 
fires in the decadent fuelbeds. 
If, however, the goal is to recreate the natural fire regime 
(i.e., to meet the average annual burned area), the 
decision might be a little more involved. Alternative 2 would 
still be the least expensive, but alternatives 3 and 4 would 
require much less program or budgeted dollars to accomplish 
the objective and result in much more of the acreage burning 
under natural conditions (natural ignition sources and during 
the natural fire season). 
Containment or confinement strategies can only be used when 
they are less expensive than controlling a given fire (USDA 
Forest Service 1989). Table 1 shows that containment cost 
less than control 56 percent of the times it was used and that 
confinement cost less or about the same as control 78 percent 
of the times it was used. This suggests that containment and 
confinement are both feasible and cost-effective for our case 
study ares .  
Risk is incorporated into the analysis through the probability 
of a fire resulting in excessive resource damages or 
suppression costs (e.g., fire which cost over $850,000 to 
suppress regardless of the strategy used). However, none of 
the confinement or prescribed natural fire responses resulted 
in a catastrophic fire, and it could be argued that $953,000 
(the most expensive gamed fire) is not really catastrophic 
when compared to historic fires like the 1966 Fire. 
The Fire burned 93,600 acres of the case study area 
and cost over $6.2 million (in 1988 dollars) to suppress. But, 
since the Fire occurred under extreme site-specific 
weather conditions, it would receive a control response under 
any alternative; and, since it became catastrophic despite 
control efforts (the only possible response in 1966) it could 
happen again under any alternative. The risk of another 
catastrophic fire might seem greater under alternatives 3 and 
4, since fires are allowed to get larger, but this is only the 
short term risk factor. These alternatives would allow more 
acres to bum under natural conditions, resulting in cleaner 
bums than management ignited off-season fires and larger 
breaks in the decadent fuelbeds, which should help to limit 
the size of future fires. 
SUMMARY 
Developing cost-effective wilderness management 
programs is a dilemma faced by many Forest Service land 
managers. Wilderness fire management is a requirement, but 
the value of fire in wilderness remains undefinable in 
monetary terms so it is excluded from most Forest Service 
economic analyses. Therefore, cost-effectiveness analysis, 
using the recreation of the natural fire regime as the 
objective, can provide important economic information. 
Decision trees help us predict future fire occurrence 
potentials, and intensive gaming efforts help us estimate fire 
sizes and costs associated with the implementation of 
appropriate suppression responses and prescribed natural 
fires. Case study results suggest that appropriate suppression 
responses could provide cost-effective alternatives to current 
control-oriented practices. Through this extensive and 
thorough cost-effectiveness analysis we can, hopefully, avoid 
some of the costly mistakes of past experiences in wilderness 
fire management. 
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